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Estimating the Effect of Voters’
Media Awareness on the 2016 US
Presidential Election
Lauren Dique and Maria Gallego
Abstract
We examine whether voter media awareness of the 2016 US Presidential elec-
tion campaign influenced the election using a logit model to estimate the probability
that a voter with certain characteristics votes for one of the two candidates. Our
results indicate that the more active voters were on social media, the more likely
they were to vote for Trump, and the more aware they were of the electoral
campaign (watching TV, listening to the radio, reading newspapers, etc.) and the
more interested they were in the news/politics, the less likely they were to vote for
Trump. The impact of these variables was not as important as their
sociodemographic characteristics.
Keywords: 2016 US Presidential election, candidates’ and voters’ policy positions,
voters’ awareness of the election, probability of voting, voters’ activity on social
media, voters’media interests on the campaign
1. Introduction
The 2016 US Presidential election stands out as an anomaly in election history. A
candidate with no prior political experience used his advantage on social media and,
in particular, on Twitter to reach the oval office. The election took over the media in
extensive news coverage, TV ads, and social media trending. The awareness this
election generated due to explicit and implicit advertising may have had a large
impact on the outcome. Obama was the first candidate to utilize Twitter and other
social media platforms in order to communicate directly with voters during the
2012 election (see Ref. [1]). Trump stormed the media and constantly trended on
Facebook and Twitter throughout the campaign and used Twitter to speak freely
about his platform (see Ref. [2]).
We examine whether voter awareness of the electoral campaign affects voting
decisions. Following Schofield et al [3], we model voters’ utility functions as
depending on their preferences on an economic and a social policy dimension and
sociodemographic characteristics (age, race, gender, education, income, and home
state). Voters’ utility is also influenced by their awareness of the campaign through
TV news, radio, social media trending, their social media activity, the reported
ideologies of themselves, and perception of candidates’ ideology. We also include in
voters’ utilities other policy dimensions (stance on state spending on law enforce-
ment, approval of the military, increasing the number of police officers, harsher
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punishments for previous offenders, and environmental policies) and a random
shock. We derive the probability of voting for the candidates using voters’ utilities
assuming voters vote for the candidate that maximizes their utility.
Using responses to the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey and
voters’ utility functions, we estimate the probability that a voter with certain char-
acteristics votes for Trump relative to Clinton. Our findings indicate that a voter
who is more aware of media outlets (TV and radio) and that has a higher level of
social media activity is, respectively, less and more likely to vote for Trump (rela-
tive to Clinton). We also find that voters’ awareness of the campaign affected their
voting decisions, though this impact is less strong than the effect of voters’
sociodemographic characteristics. Advertising and awareness, in the form of active
use of social media, influenced the election. Trump raised and spent significantly
less than Clinton did an indication that campaign advertising is not just a matter of
dollars but that voters’ awareness of the campaign also affects their voting decisions
(see Ref. [4]).
Section 2 summarizes the findings in the literature on the effect that media has
on US elections. Section 3 models the utility voters derived from each candidate,
then using this utility we derive the probability that a voter votes for Trump relative
to Clinton. Section 4 gives the descriptive statistics of our data with results
presented in Section 5. Final comments are given in Section 6 with the Appendix
containing tables that support the analysis carried out in Section 5.
2. Literature review
We first review the literature on the effects of campaign advertising, the impact
of Twitter on elections, and on modeling voters’ choices using their preferences.
Huber and Arceneaux [5] study whether advertising mobilizes, informs, or
persuades citizens in non-battleground states in the 2000 Presidential election, as
candidates’ advertising campaigns did not target these voters. Using the
overlapping nature of media markets (TV) across states, they examine if campaign
advertising aimed at swing states, also airing in non-battleground states, affects
voting in non-battleground states. They argue that the volume and partisan balance
of advertising in swing states is uncorrelated with voter behavior in non-
battleground states. They find advertising campaigns did not mobilize or inform
citizens but had a strong persuasive effect with moderately aware individuals being
the most susceptible to advertising-induced changes in opinion.
Gordon and Hartmann [6] use the 2000 and 2004 US elections to analyze the
effect of market-level advertising on county-level vote shares. They use gross ratings
points (GRP) from the Campaign Media Analysis Group as their advertising vari-
able measuring the number of exposures to ads per capita. After controlling for
other factors, they find that an increase of 1000 GRPs increases the probability of
voting for the Republican and Democratic candidates by 1.5 and 1.7%.
Hong [7] uses a sample of the 112th US House of Representatives’ activity on
social media to study the impact of Twitter on the politicians’ campaign finances
from June 8 to 22, 2011. He finds that politicians’ adoption of social media increases
donations from outside their constituencies, that politicians with extreme ideologies
benefit more from social media, and that social media tends to react to salient ideas
more easily and is thus more likely to benefit political extremists. He finds that an
increase in out-of-state donations allows candidates to become more ideologically
extreme concluding that social media bridges the gap between politicians and citi-
zens, which may lead to increased inequality and polarization of candidate plat-
forms.
2
Elections - A Global Perspective
Schofield et al [3] builds stochastic models of the 2000 and 2004 US Presidential
elections with valences1 that affect voter’s decisions. After placing voters in an
economic and social policy space using factor analysis, they estimate a cleavage line,
from a binomial logit model, dividing likely Democratic and Republican voters, and
find voters’ valence judgments and policy preferences significantly influence can-
didates’ policy choices.
For the 2008 Presidential election, Clarke et al [8] models voters’ choices using a
valence model (including stance on social, economic, and education issues), parti-
sanship, and party leader images. They find that McCain had a positive image as
voters viewed him as more experienced, patriotic, and trustworthy than Obama but
that voters’ believed Obama would improve America’s standing. Despite the pres-
ence of racial resentment, meaning that those with it had a negative view of Obama
and a positive view of McCain, they find that Obama inspired hope with a “yes we
can” attitude, typical in valence politics, and attributed Obama’s higher valence to
the belief that he could tackle the nation’s issues and get the job done.
The literature finds that campaign advertising has an impact and a persuasive
effect on voter’s decisions. The large discrepancy between Clinton’s and Trump’s
Twitter followers and number of tweets indicates that Trump had an advantage on
social media as Trump more effectively used social media to connect directly with
voters (see Ref. [9]). We study the effect that voters’ awareness of the campaign
had on their choice of candidate after taking into account the effect of differences
between voters’ and candidates’ economic and social policy preferences, voters’
sociodemographic characteristics, and their stance on other policy dimensions.
3. Modeling voters’ electoral choices
In this section, we first model voters’ electoral choices using the utility they
derive from each candidate, then using the assumptions made on the shock affect-
ing their utility derive the probability that the voter votes for Trump relative to
Clinton.
We model the utility voter i derives from candidate j for j ¼ Clinton, Trump as a
function of i’s preferences, characteristics, and a random shock observed only by i
and assume i votes for the candidate that maximizes i’s utility. The utility voter i
derives from candidate j is given by
Uij ¼ αe ei  Ej
 2
 αs si  Sj
 2
þ βj  sociodemoi
 
þ γj  awarenessi
 
þ δj  participationi
 
þ ρj  ideologyi
 
þ θj  otheri
 
þ λj þ uij:
(1)
We assume voters have preferences over the economic and social policies they
would like candidates to implement if elected. Voter i’s ideal, or most preferred,
economic and social policies are given by ei and si in Eq. (1). Prior to the election,
candidates announce their economic and social policy platforms. Candidate j’s eco-
nomic and social policy platforms are given by Ej and Sj in Eq. (1). The positive
coefficients αe and αs in Eq. (1) measure the importance voters give to the economic
and social policy dimensions. The terms αe si  Sj
 2
and αs ei  Ej
 2
capture the
disutility i experiences when j’s economic and social policy platforms differ from i’s
1 Valence is voters’ non-policy evaluations of candidates and in particular in [3] measures voters’ beliefs
on the ability of a candidate to govern effectively.
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ideal policies, so that the farther j’s policies, Ej and Sj, are from i’s ideal policies, ei
and si, the lower is i’s utility from candidate j.
Voters’ individual sociodemographic characteristics (age, education, gender,
income, and race) affect their voting behavior independent of their policy positions,
through i’s sociodemographic valence for j, ðβj  sociodemoiÞ in Eq. (1), given by
βj  sociodemoi  βj1agei þ βj2educi þ βj3genderi þ βj4incomei þ βj5racei:
We allow voters’ awareness of the electoral campaign to affect their utility
function to examine if their awareness of the campaign influences their choice of
candidate. Aware measures the number of media-related things the voter did in the
past 24 hours (watch TV news, listen to the radio, read the newspaper, read a blog)
with higher values measuring higher engagement by the voter in these events. A
higher socialmedia value indicates i’s greater participation in social media activities.
Voter i’s political activities include i’s political meeting attendance and postings of
political signs. The newsint variable indicates the self-reported level of interest the
voter had in the news. These variables affect voters’ choices through voters’ aware-
ness valence, γj  awarenessi
 
in Eq. (1), given by
γj  awarenessi  γj1awarei þ γj2socialmediai þ γj3attendi þ γj4signsi þ γj5newsinti:
Voter i’s political participation valence, δj  participationi
 
in Eq. (1), measures
whether the voter worked on a political campaign or donated money to candidate j, i.e.,
δj  participationi  δj1workedi þ δj2donatedi:
Voters’ ideology and their perception of candidates’ ideology may affect their
voting decisions. The self-reported ideology is rated on a scale of very conservative (7)
to very liberal (1), whereas voters’ perception of candidate’s ideology is rated from
very liberal (1) to very conservative (7). These variables capture voters’ beliefs of
where they stand relative to their perception of candidates’ ideology. The ideology
valence ρj  ideologyi
 
in Eq. (1), is given by
ρj  ideologyi  ρj1selfideologyi þ ρj2idelogyClintoni þ ρj3idelogyTrumpi:
We also added other policy variables that may affect the utility voters derive
from candidates. We included voter’s opinions on increasing state spending on law
enforcement and their approval of the military ensuring the supply of oil. We also
incorporated voters’ opinions on increasing the number of police officers (crime a),
their support for harsher prison sentences for individuals with prior offenses (crime
b), and their stance on environmental policies. We grouped these variables in what
we call the other policy valence, θj  otheri
 
in Eq. (1), given by
θj  otheri  θj1lawenforcementi þ θj2militaryi þ θj3crimeai
þ θj4crimebi þ θj5environmentali:
As in Schofeld et al [3], we model i’s belief of j’s competence, or ability to govern,
through the competence valence, λj þ uij
 
in Eq. (1) where λj denotes mean of
voters’ belief of j’s competence or ability to govern2 and uij is the idiosyncratic
2 In the empirical work below, λj is the constant in the regression.
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component of i’s belief of j’s competence that is only observed by i and that varies
around λj according to a type I extreme value distribution.
Voter i’s utility from j has an observable (O) component, UOij , that depends on
voters’ disutility from candidates’ platforms differing from their ideals, the valences
(sociodemographic, media, political participation, ideology, other, and compe-
tence), and on a random component, uij. So that Uij in Eq. (1) is given by
Uij ¼ U
O
ij þ uij (2)
where UOij ¼ αe ei  Ej
 2
 αs si  Sj
 2
þ βj  sociodemoi
 
þ γj mediai
 
þ δj  participationi
 
þ ρj  ideologyi
 
þ θj  otheri
 
þ λj:
We assume that only Clinton and Trump run in the election and code the vote of
i for Trump as 1 (Y i ¼ 1) and make Clinton the base candidate (Y i ¼ 0), so that the
dependent variable Y i is coded as
Y i ¼
1 if voted for Trump
0 if voted for Clinton
(
Voter i votes for Trump when the utility i derives from Trump is greater than
that of voting for Clinton, i.e., when Ui Trump>Ui Clinton and votes for Clinton other-
wise. Since i’s utility from j is affected by a random component, uij, the probability
that i votes for Trump is given by Probi Trump Ui Trump>Ui Clinton
 
, and since uij is
drawn from a type I extreme value distribution, the probability that i votes for
Trump has a logit specification, i.e.,
Probi Trump Y i ¼ 1j x½  ¼
exp UOi Trump
n o
1þ exp UOi Trump
n o (3)
where exp is the exponential function and x is the vector of factors included in the
observable component of i’s utility function, UOi Trump given in Eq. (2).
3,4
The marginal impact of an explanatory variable on the probability that i votes
for Trump is obtained by finding the marginal effect that say variable xk has on
Eq. (3), holding all other factors in i’s utility function in Eq. (1) constant at some
specified value, usually their means. The marginal effect of xk on Probi Trump in
Eq. (3), obtained by taking the partial derivative of Eq. (3) with respect to xk, is
given by
∂Pi Trump
∂xk
¼ Pr Y i ¼ 1j x½   Pr Y i ¼ 0j x½   βk (4)
∂Pi Trump
∂xk
¼
exp Ui Trump
 
1þ exp Ui Trump
  1
1þ exp Ui Trump
  βk (5)
3 The coefficients in Clinton’s utility function (the base candidate) are standardized to zero, so that the
“1” in the denominator of Eq. (3) stands for exp Ui Clintonf g ¼ e
0 ¼ 1.
4 If instead we assume that all valences have an observable mean component affected by random shocks
observable only by the voter that vary around the mean valences according to type I extreme value
distributions, the probability that i votes for j still has a logit specification as shown in Eq. (3).
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where Pr Y i ¼ 1j x½  is the probability that i votes for Trump and Pr Y i ¼ 0j x½  ¼
1 Pr Y i ¼ 1j x½  is that of voting for Clinton. These probabilities change in a
nonlinearmanner as xk changes. As shown in Eqs. (4) and (5), the marginal effect of
xk on Pi Trump is the product of the logit coefficient, βk, and the probabilities of
voting for the two candidates. The marginal effect measures the impact of a one-
unit change in the explanatory variable on the probability that an individual votes
for Trump relative to Clinton, the base candidate, holding all other variables at the
mean, so that Pr Y i ¼ 1j x½  and Pr Y i ¼ 0j x½  can be estimated.
4. Descriptive statistics
We now provide the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.
Our data comes from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES),
a nationally representative sample of the voting age population, interviewing
64,600 pre- and post-election respondents. We exclude those not voting for Clinton
or Trump from our sample. Since the post-election follow-up survey asked the same
individuals “For whom did you vote for President of the United States?,” we know
whom each individual voted for assuming truthful revelation.
The 2016 CCES survey includes a wide range of responses to related questions
essentially conveying similar though different information on voters’ preferences.
Given the high correlation among these questions, these variables should not be
simultaneously included in the regressions to avoid multicollinearity effects that
may render the regression coefficient estimates unstable and that lead to the inter-
pretation of the effect of these variables on the probability of voting for Trump,
relative to Clinton, difficult. Rather than including a large number of highly corre-
lated variables, we use the principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the number
of correlated variables included in the regression. The PCA performs orthogonal
transformations to convert correlated variables into a smaller set of linearly
uncorrelated variables called principal components.5 The PCA gives the factor load-
ing6 of each principal component variable and identifies a smaller set of latent
dimensions along which voters make their decisions.
Schofield et al [3],7 we perform a PCA on 12 survey questions relating to voters’
stances on the military, welfare spending, condition of the economy, approval of
Obama, gun control, immigration, abortion, gay marriage, budget cuts, personal
ideology, tax increases, and racism. Table A.1 in the Appendix contains the ques-
tions used in the analysis and the coding of possible responses. We use the PCA
factor loadings for each question and each voter’s response to each question to
derive each voter’s preferences along the dimensions identified in the PCA.
The PCA revealed two latent dimensions, labeled as the social and economic
dimensions. Table 1 shows the PCA factor loadings for each survey question. The
first component has two heavy loadings, racism (consistent with Schofield et al [3])
5 For example, if supporting gay marriage and abortion have a high correlation, the PCA analysis would
group these two variables into a single component.
6 Factor loadings represent how much a component explains the latent variable in the factor analysis.
Their values range between 1 and 1 with values close in absolute value to 1 (0) indicating that the
component has a strong (weak) effect on the latent variable.
7 In their study of the 2000 and 2004 US presidential election, [3] finds that voters tend to make voting
decisions along two economic and social latent dimensions. After locating voters along these two
dimensions, they find that to maximize vote share candidates locate close to electoral mean, the average
of voters’ location along these two dimensions.
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and military, on the economic dimension. We anticipated that voters’ opinion on
economic problems and spending would load strongly in the economic dimension,
as found in the literature; however this was not the case in our sample. Perhaps the
2016 election was too different from previous elections. The loadings indicate which
component is associated with our social dimension and are consistent with previous
literature (such as abortion and gay marriage).
We multiplied the significantly different from zero factor loading of each vari-
able, given in Table 1, with the corresponding response of the voter to that ques-
tion, and then aggregated these products according to their identification in the
economic or social dimensions to find voters’ locations along these two latent
dimensions and assume these locations represent their preferences in these dimen-
sions. Using the factor loadings in Table 1, voter i’s location along these two
dimensions, ei and si in Eq. (1), are estimated as follows:
ei ¼ 0:4058Military Approvali þ 0:8535 Racismi
si ¼ 0:3249 Tax Increasesi þ 0:3255 State Welfare Spendingi
0:3456 Economic problemsi þ 0:4131 Approve of Obamai
þ0:2907 Gun controli þ 0:2906 Immigrationi
þ0:3091 Abortioni þ 0:3027 Gaysi þ 0:3373 Federal spendingi
Right on the economic axis (horizontal) in Figure 1 represents an individual that
approves of the military and is fearful of people of other races. We interpret north
on the social axis (vertical) as liberal concerning, for example, civil rights issues.
Figure 1 shows that, while the Clinton and Trump voters are clearly divided along
the social dimension, there is no strong divide among them in the economic axis.
Table 2 echoes Figure 1 indicating that, on average, Trump voters are more con-
servative (1.757) in their social values and Clinton’s more liberal (1.753). The
statistics of the two candidates along the economic dimension are relatively similar
in mean, median, and standard deviations.
Question Economic policy Social policy
1. Military approval 0.4058 0.1564
2. Tax increases 0.0934 0.3249
3. Racism 0.8535 0.0633
4. State welfare spending 0.1545 0.3255
5. Economic problems 0.0671 0.3456
6. Approve of Obama 0.0635 0.4131
7. Gun control 0.1236 0.2907
8. Immigration 0.1593 0.2906
9. Abortion 0.1295 0.3091
10. Gays 0.0855 0.3027
11. Federal spending 0.0317 0.3373
aBolded factor loadings are statistically significantly different from zero.
Table 1.
PCA factor loadings from the CCES 2016 survey.a
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Schofield et al [3], candidates’ platforms, Sj and Ej, are at the mean of voters’
ideal policies so that we can estimate voters’ disutility when candidates adopt
policies that differ from their ideals,  si  Sj
 2
and  ei  Ej
 2
in Eq. (3).
Since voter’s decisions depend on more than their economic and social stances,
we control for voters’ sociodemographic characteristics, reported ideologies,
“other” policy variables, and our awareness valence. Table 3 shows that, while a
larger proportion of women voted for Clinton, a larger proportion of men voted for
Trump (see Figure 2a where 0 = male and 1 = female). Clinton had a higher
proportion of nonwhite voters as 70% of her voters were white than Trump’s 88%
(see Figure 2b where 0 = nonwhite and 1 = white) with a higher proportion of
educated and young individuals voting for Clinton (Figures 2c and d).
In Table 4, the self-reported ideologies and voters’ perceived ideologies of each
candidate show that Trump voters, on average, identify themselves as “conserva-
tive” and perceive Clinton as “very liberal” and Trump as “somewhat conserva-
tive.” Clinton voters, on average, identify themselves as “somewhat liberal” and
perceive Clinton as “somewhat liberal” and Trump as “very conservative.” Clinton
voters are more pro-environmental than Trump’s, and Trump (Clinton) voters
prefer to increase (maintain) state spending on law enforcement and support
(oppose) increasing the number of police officers.
Figure 1.
Voter policy positions in 2016 US Presidential election.
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Clinton voters (15,264)
Social 1.753 1.925 1.148 3.994 4.194
Economic 0.024 0.218 0.986 1.972 3.909
Trump voters (12,314)
Social 1.757 1.934 1.299 4.103 3.478
Economic 0.032 0.150 0.991 2.039 3.806
Table 2.
Descriptive statistics: economic and social policy dimensions.
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It is well known that voters’ choice of candidate may depend on their state of
residence (see also Refs. [10, 11]) and that candidates carry out their campaign
mostly in swing states. To control for differences across states, we create Demo-
cratic, Republican, and Swing dummy variables for voters living in Democratic,
Republican, and swing states, coded using Politico’s June 2016 list of swing states
(see Table A.2 in the Appendix and [12]) called the state swingness variable.
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Clinton voters (15,264 voters)
Birth year 1965.9 1964 16.008 1923 1998
Female 0.554 1 0.497 0 1
Education 4.176 5 1.426 1 6
White 0.699 1 0.459 0 1
Family income 7.124 7 3.575 1 31
Trump voters (12,314 voters)
Birth year 1960.7 1959 14.69 1923 1998
Female 0.451 0 0.498 0 1
Education 3.647 3 1.414 1 6
White 0.880 1 0.325 0 1
Family income 7.026 7 3.390 1 31
Table 3.
Descriptive statistics: sociodemographic characteristics.
Figure 2.
(a) Female and male voters by candidate. (b) White and nonwhite voters by candidate. (c) Voter education by
candidate. (d) Voter birth year by candidate.
9
Estimating the Effect of Voters’ Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964
5. Estimating the probability of voting for Trump
We examine the effect that the various components in voters’ utility function in
Eq. (1) have on the probability that voters choose a particular candidate in Eq. (3).
We estimate a set of logit models sequentially adding groups of variables to show
the effect these variables, as a group, have on the models’ decision criteria and later
discuss their marginal effects on the probability of voting for Trump.
Variables Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Clinton voters (15,264 voters)
Aware 2.126 2 0.932 1 4
Social media 0.163 0 0.370 0 1
Attend 1.654 1 1.674 0 5
Sign 0.204 0 0.403 0 1
Work 0.099 0 0.298 0 1
Donate 0.346 0 0.476 0 1
News interest 1.513 1 0.806 1 7
Ideology (self) 5.141 5 1.425 1 7
Ideology (Clinton) 3.210 3 1.443 1 8
Ideology (Trump) 6.156 7 1.876 1 8
Military 1.114 1 0.318 1 2
Environment 1.984 2 0.124 1 2
Law enforcement 2.559 3 0.944 1 5
Crime policy a 1.564 2 0.496 1 2
Crime policy b 1.249 1 0.432 1 2
Trump voters (12,314 voters)
Aware 2.020 2 0.902 1 4
Social media 0.132 0 0.338 0 1
Attend 1.379 1 1.637 0 5
Sign 0.209 0 0.407 0 1
Work 0.051 0 0.220 0 1
Donate 0.251 0 0.434 0 1
News interest 1.460 1 0.762 1 7
Ideology (self) 2.567 2 1.251 1 7
Ideology (Clinton) 1.767 1 1.721 1 8
Ideology (Trump) 4.947 5 1.434 1 8
Military 1.295 1 0.456 1 2
Environment 1.596 2 0.491 1 2
Law enforcement 2.042 2 0.886 1 5
Crime policy a 1.278 1 0.448 1 2
Crime policy b 1.051 1 0.221 1 2
Table 4.
Descriptive statistics: all other variables.
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Table 5 shows the results for the basic policy model (column 1), then we add
voters’ sociodemographic characteristics (column 2). The decision criteria (highest
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Full
Social2 0.110***
(34.300)
0.100***
(28.730)
0.131***
(34.160)
0.086***
(16.850)
0.098***
(15.160)
0.075***
(10.350)
Economic2 0.043***
(4.920)
0.080***
(8.470)
0.089***
(9.130)
0.049***
(4.490)
0.037***
(2.790)
0.021
(1.620)
Military 0.878***
(21.0)
0.577***
(11.000)
Environment 3.599***
(47.910)
2.196***
(25.400)
Law
enforcement
0.375***
(19.330)
0.243***
(9.880)
Crime policy a 0.753***
(20.690)
0.412***
(8.930)
Crime policy b 1.204***
(20.770)
0.649***
(9.030)
Birth year 0.012***
(13.560)
0.015***
(16.140)
0.001
(0.780)
0.000
(0.040)
0.006***
(3.770)
Female 0.332***
(12.290)
0.366***
(13.110)
0.322***
(9.570)
0.222***
(5.480)
0.235***
(5.500)
Education 0.284***
(28.290)
0.239***
(23.040)
0.164***
(13.060)
0.191***
(12.590)
0.160***
(9.940)
White 0.927***
(26.340)
0.971***
(27.020)
1.143***
(26.540)
1.248***
(24.670)
1.282***
(24.300)
State
“swingness”
0.485***
(14.460)
0.485***
(14.190)
0.377***
(9.180)
0.122***
(2.420)
0.121**
(2.290)
Family income 0.022***
(5.400)
0.034***
(8.050
0.020***
(3.960)
0.012*
(1.900)
0.009
(1.320)
Social2 0.110***
(34.300)
0.100***
(28.730)
0.131***
(34.160)
0.086***
(16.850)
0.098***
(15.160)
0.075***
(10.350)
Aware 0.046***
(2.840)
0.075***
(3.840)
0.068***
(2.870)
0.086***
(3.460)
Attend 0.083**
(1.970)
0.014
(0.270)
0.058
(0.930)
0.004
(0.050)
Social media 0.057***
(6.340)
0.037***
(3.270)
0.002
(0.180)
0.004
(0.260)
Signs 0.251***
(6.680)
0.255***
(5.510)
0.294***
(5.100)
0.279***
(4.560)
Work 0.582***
(9.850)
0.392***
(5.260)
0.256***
(2.850)
0.175*
(1.800)
Donate 0.756***
(21.810)
0.648***
(14.960)
0.471***
(8.920)
0.460***
(8.030)
News interest 0.109***
(5.680)
0.128***
(5.960)
0.113***
(4.240)
0.118***
(4.440)
Ideology (self) 1.083***
(70.830)
0.930***
(59.000)
Ideology
(Clinton)
0.413***
(34.900)
0.340***
(28.910)
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Full
Ideology
(Trump)
0.253***
(24.410)
0.209***
(19.760)
λ 0.759***
(34.960)
22.805***
(13.240)
29.578***
(15.840)
9.879***
(4.340)
5.697**
(2.060)
1.120
(0.380)
Log
likelihood
18333.82 16487.57 16012.94 11753.72 8529.503 7795.902
AIC 36673.64 32993.14 32057.88 23549.43 17097.01 15639.8
BIC 36698.32 33066.89 32188.99 23721.42 17252.58 15836.21
Obs = N 27,578 26,767 26,758 26,639 26,580 26,462
|z-score| in parentheses.***prob <0.001, **prob <0.05, *prob <0.1.
Table 5.
Logit model specifications (base = Clinton).
Model 1 Model 2
Variables Coefficient Z-score Coefficient Z-score
Social2 0.076*** 10.580 0.075*** 10.350
Economic2 0.022 1.650 0.021 1.620
Military b 0.581*** 11.210 0.577*** 11.000
Environment 2.219*** 25.820 2.196*** 25.400
Law enforcement 0.243*** 10.000 0.243*** 9.880
Crime policy a 0.419*** 9.200 0.412*** 8.930
Crime policy b 0.651*** 9.150 0.649*** 9.030
Birth year 0.006*** 3.860 0.006*** 3.770
Female 0.238*** 5.630 0.235*** 5.500
Education 0.159*** 10.020 0.160*** 9.940
White 1.317*** 25.280 1.282*** 24.300
State 0.001 0.640 0.121** 2.290
Family income 0.005 0.850 0.009 1.320
Aware 0.087*** 3.570 0.086*** 3.460
Attend 0.007 0.110 0.004 0.050
Social media 0.004 0.290 0.004 0.260
Signs 0.264*** 4.370 0.279*** 4.560
Work 0.201** 2.090 0.175* 1.800
Donate 0.456*** 8.080 0.460*** 8.030
News interest 0.127*** 4.880 0.118*** 4.440
Ideology (self) 0.933*** 60.040 0.930*** 59.000
Ideology (Clinton) 0.343*** 29.600 0.340*** 28.910
Ideology (Trump) 0.212*** 20.360 0.209*** 19.760
λ 1.113 0.380 1.120 0.380
State “swingness” 0.121** 2.290
12
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log likelihood ratio and the lowest AIC and BIC statistics) show that voters’
sociodemographic characteristics are an important determinant of their voting
decisions. Adding the awareness variables (column 3) and the ideology variables
(column 4) also improves the model’s specification. The full model (column 6), our
Model 1 Model 2
Variables Coefficient Z-score Coefficient Z-score
Log likelihood 7990.705 7795.902
AIC 16029.41 15639.8
BIC 16226.53 15836.21
Obs = N 27,264 26,462
***prob. <0.001, **prob. <0.05, *prob. <0.1.
Table 6.
State “swingness” models (base = Clinton).
Variable Meana Marginal effect Z-scoresb
Social2 4.532 0.019*** 10.240
Economic2 0.974 0.005 1.620
Militarya 1.193 0.142*** 10.980
Environment 1.811 0.541*** 24.620
Law enforcement 2.331 0.060*** 9.880
Crime policy a 1.437 0.101*** 8.930
Crime policy b 1.162 0.160*** 9.060
Birth year 1963.6 0.001*** 3.760
Female 0.508 0.058*** 5.500
Education 3.940 0.039*** 9.930
White 0.782 0.316*** 24.310
State “swingness” 0.447 0.030** 2.290
Family income 7.080 0.002 1.320
Aware 2.078 0.021*** 3.460
Attend 0.149 0.001 0.050
Social media 1.531 0.001 0.260
Signs 0.207 0.069*** 4.560
Work 0.077 0.043* 1.800
Donate 0.304 0.113*** 8.040
News interest 1.489 0.029*** 4.440
Ideology (self) 3.998 0.229*** 58.870
Ideology (Clinton) 2.567 0.084*** 28.780
Ideology (Trump) 5.619 0.051*** 19.810
aMarginal effects are calculated holding all other variables at the mean of all voters given in this column.
b***prob. <0.001, **prob. <0.05, *prob. <0.1.
Table 7.
Marginal effects (base = Clinton).
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preferred model specification, includes all of the previous variables plus the “other”
policy variables and gives the best fit according to the decision criteria statistics. The
sign and significance of the coefficients of all variables except the economic dimen-
sion, attend, and social media are significant and stable across model specifications.
The economic dimension becomes insignificant in column (6) after introducing
other policy variables, which improves the model fit as seen in the decision criteria
statistics.
We take an alternative approach to the fixed effects used in the literature by
incorporating the real swingness of each state as reported by Politico in June 2016
prior to the election. Tables 5 and 6 show that the full model with the state
swingness variable gives a better fit to the data.
The logit coefficients given in Tables 5 and 6 do notmeasure the marginal effect
that a variable has on the probability of voting for Trump. As shown in Eqs. (3)–(5),
this probability varies in a nonlinear manner with changes in variable xk while
holding all other variables at their mean. A positive marginal effect indicates that an
increase in the variable results in an increased probability that an individual with
mean characteristics votes for Trump (relative to Clinton), whereas a negative
marginal effect decreases this probability.
Table 7 shows the marginal effects on the probability of voting for Trump of
each variable and their significant levels holding all other variables at their mean
(given in column 2). A white voter that has the mean characteristics in all the other
variables is 31.6% (which is significantly different from zero) more likely to vote for
Trump relative to Clinton. A mean voter who approves of using the military for
securing the oil supply is 14.2% more likely to vote for Trump, who cares about the
environment is 54.1% less likely to vote for Trump, and who views themselves as
very liberal on the ideology scale is 22.9% less likely to vote for Trump. An increase
in the level of education, from say high school to some college, decreases the
probability of voting for Trump by almost 4%.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine which factors influence the probability that an indi-
vidual votes for Trump relative to Clinton in the 2016 US Presidential election. Our
major contribution is the addition of variables that measure voters’ awareness of the
electoral campaign after controlling for other factors that the literature finds signif-
icantly affect voters’ choice of US Presidential candidate. Others in the literature
include the number of advertising per capita or the amounts spent on advertising.
We opt for a different approach by looking at the effect of the media on voters’
choices by using data at the voter level. That is, our awareness variables measure
voters’ direct interest in the news, their use of social media, and their interest in the
electoral campaign. By measuring variables at the voter level, we capture the impact
that voters’media awareness had on their voting decisions. We also estimate voters’
position along the economic and social dimensions to study the influence the dis-
utility voters derive from candidates adopting positions that differ from their ideal
policies had on their voting decisions.
We estimate a set of binomial logit regressions to examine the probability that a
voter with certain characteristics votes for Trump relative to Clinton. Our results
indicate that the more active a voter with mean characteristics is on social media,
the more likely she/he was to vote for Trump. We also find that the more aware the
mean voter was of the media (TV, radio, reading newspaper) and the more inter-
ested she/he was in the news, the less likely she/he was to vote for Trump. Even
14
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though the mean voter’s awareness of the campaign impacted the mean voter’s
decision, the stances on social and economic issues, perceived ideologies, and voter
sociodemographic had a greater impact on her/his voting decision.
The 2016 US election was the first election in which a candidate adopted a
Twitter platform to communicate directly with voters. Our results indicate that
future candidates should capitalize on this low-cost approach to bridging the gap
between themselves and voters. Hong [7] argues that social media allows the voter
to self-select in the form of a “follow” or “friend” to reinforce their ideological
positions. Trump sent almost four times more tweets than Clinton did, finding
many supporters along the way (see Ref. [9]). Furthermore, social media tends to
react to salient ideas more easily and faster and therefore is more likely to benefit
political extremists (see Ref. [7]). Although voter awareness has a lower impact
than say, race, in the 2016 election, it still influenced the mean voter’s choice of
candidate. Future candidates can learn from the 2016 election as it may have
changed the political campaign battleground forever.
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A. Appendix
Variable Question Coding
Economic
problems
Over the past year the nation’s economy
has…?
1. Gotten much better
2. Gotten better
3. Stayed the same
4. Gotten worse
5. Gotten much worse
Approve of
Obama
Do you approve of the way each is doing
their job?
1. Strongly disapprove
2. Somewhat disapprove
3. Somewhat approve
4. Strongly approve
Gun control On the issue of gun regulation, do you
support or oppose each of the following
proposals? Make it easier for people to
obtain concealed-carry permit
1. Support
2. Oppose
Immigration What do you think the US government
should do about immigration? Select all
that apply. Grant legal status to all illegal
immigrants who have held jobs and paid
taxes for at least 3 years and not been
convicted of any felony crimes
1. No
2. Yes
15
Estimating the Effect of Voters’ Media Awareness on the 2016 US Presidential Election
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.80964
Variable Question Coding
Abortion Do you support or oppose each of the
following proposals?
Always allow a woman to obtain an
abortion as a matter of choice
1. Oppose
2. Support
Economic
problems
Over the past year the nation’s economy
has…?
1. Gotten much better
2. Gotten better
3. Stayed the same
4. Gotten worse
5. Gotten much worse
Gun control On the issue of gun regulation, do you
support or oppose each of the following
proposals? Make it easier for people to
obtain concealed-carry permit
1. Support
2. Oppose
Gay marriage Do you favor or oppose allowing gays and
lesbians to marry legally?
1. Oppose
2. Favor
Federal
spending
The federal budget deficit is
approximately 1 trillion dollar this year. If
the Congress were to balance the budget,
it would have to consider cutting defense
spending, cutting domestic spending
(such as Medicare and Social Security), or
raising taxes to cover the deficit. Please
rank the options below from what would
you most prefer that the Congress do to
what you would least prefer they do: (1)
cut defense spending, (2) cut domestic
spending, and (3) raise taxes
1. Cut domestic first
2. Cut domestic second
3. Cut domestic last
Ideology (self) How would you rate each of the following
individuals and groups?
Yourself
1. Very conservative
2. Conservative
3. Somewhat conservative
4. Middle of the road
5. Somewhat liberal
6. Liberal
7. Very liberal
Military a Would you approve of the use of US
military troops in ensuring the supply of
oil?
1. No
2. Yes
Military b Would you approve of the use of US
military troops in order to destroy a
terrorist camp?
1. No
2. Yes
State spending
on welfare
State legislatures must make choices
when making spending decisions on
important state programs. Would you
like your legislature to increase or
decrease spending on the five areas
below? Welfare
1. Greatly decrease
2. Slightly decrease
3. Maintain
4. Slightly increase
5. Greatly increase
Tax increases If your state were to have a budget deficit
this year, it would have to raise taxes on
income and sales or cut spending, such as
on education, health care, welfare, and
road construction. What would you
prefer more, raising taxes or cutting
spending? Choose a point along the scale
from 100% tax increases (and no
spending cuts) to 100% spending cuts
The values range between 0 and 100.
The closer to 0 the more they prefer
increases in taxes
The closer to 100 the more they
prefer spending cuts
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Variable Question Coding
(and no tax increases). The point in the
middle means that the budget should be
balanced with equal amounts of spending
cuts and tax increases
Racism Question: I often find myself fearful of
people of other races
1. Strongly disagree
2. Somewhat disagree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Somewhat agree
5. Strongly agree
Aware In the past 24 hours have you (check all
that apply) (1) read a blog, (2) watched
TV news, (3) read a newspaper in print
or online, (4) listened to a radio news
program or talk radio, or (5) used
social media (such as Facebook or
YouTube)?
This variable is taken as an aggregate.
The higher the coded number the
greater their awareness
Social media Did you do any of the following on social
media (such as Facebook, YouTube, or
Twitter)? Posted a story, photo, video, or
link about politics; Posted a comment
about politics; Read a story or watched a
video about politics; Followed a political
event; Forwarded a story, photo, video,
or link about politics to friends
This variable is taken as an aggregate.
The higher the social media variable
the more active the voter was on
social media
Attend During the past year, did you attend local
political meetings (such as school board
or city council)?
1. Yes
2. No
Signs During the past year, did you put up a
political sign (such as a lawn sign or
bumper sticker)?
1. Yes
2. No
Work During the past year, did you work for a
candidate or campaign?
1. Yes
2. No
Donate During the past year, did you donate
money to a candidate, campaign, or
political organization?
1. Yes
2. No
Ideology
(Clinton)
Question: How would you rate each of
the following individuals and groups?
Hillary Clinton
1. Very liberal
2. Liberal
3. Somewhat liberal
4. Middle of the road
5. Somewhat conservative
6. Conservative
7. Very conservative
Ideology
(Trump)
Question: How would you rate each of
the following individuals and groups?
Donald Trump
1. Very liberal
2. Liberal
3. Somewhat liberal
4. Middle of the road
5. Somewhat conservative
6. Conservative
7. Very conservative
State spending
on law
enforcement
State legislatures must make choices
when making spending decisions on
important state programs. Would you
like your legislature to increase or
decrease spending on the five areas
below? Law enforcement
1. Greatly increase
2. Slightly increase
3. Maintain
4. Slightly decrease
5. Greatly decrease
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Variable Question Coding
Crime
policy a
Do you support or oppose each of the
following proposals?
Increase the number of police on the
street by 10 percent, even if it means
fewer funds for other public services
1. Support
2. Oppose
Crime policy b Do you support or oppose each of the
following proposals?
Increase prison sentences for felons who
have already committed two or more
serious or violent crimes
1. Support
2. Oppose
Interest in the
news
Some people seem to follow what’s going
on in government and public affairs most
of the time, whether there’s an election
going on or not. Others are not that
interested. Would you say you follow
what’s going on in government and public
affairs?
1. Most of the time
2. Some of the time
3. Only now and then
4. Hardly at all
Environmental
policy
Do you support or oppose each of the
following proposals? Give Environmental
Protection Agency power to regulate
carbon dioxide emissions; Raise required
fuel efficiency for the average automobile
from 25 mpg to 35 mpg; Require a
minimum amount of renewable fuels
(wind, solar, and hydroelectric) in the
generation of electricity even if electricity
prices increase somewhat CC16_333d;
Strengthen enforcement of the Clean Air
Act and Clean Water Act even if it costs
US jobs
This variable is taken as an aggregate,
if individual said support to one or
more of the environmental policies
they are coded as a higher value (2)
Table A.1.
Variable description and coding.
Republican Democratic Swing
Alabama Nebraska California New York Colorado
Alaska North Dakota Connecticut Oregon Florida
Arizona Oklahoma Delaware Rhode Island Michigan
Arkansas South Carolina District Vermont Iowa
Indiana South Dakota Hawaii Washington Nevada
Idaho Tennessee Illinois New Hampshire
Kansas Texas Maine Pennsylvania
Kentucky Utah Maryland North Carolina
Louisiana West Virginia Massachusetts Ohio
Missouri Wyoming Minnesota Virginia
Montana New Jersey Wisconsin
aSee Ref. [12].
Table A.2.
Politico’s classification of states (June 2016).a
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